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Abstract:   
The inquiry into the 2009 Victorian ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires called for ‘the State, municipal 
councils, individuals, household members and the broader community’ to accept their share of 
responsibility for managing the risk posed by bushfire.   
This paper reports on research being conducted by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre 
and the Australian National University on how the fire and emergency services perceive their 
place in the shared responsibility spectrum.   
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Introduction 
The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission bushfires called for ‘the State, municipal 
councils, individuals, household members and the broader community’ to accept their share of 
responsibility for managing the risk posed by bushfire.  At the same time, the Commission called 
for the protection of human life to be the paramount consideration in fire policy (Victoria, 2010).  
How those considerations are to be balanced has proved difficult.  
 A review of the 2011 Western Australia fires found that the use of mass evacuations, although 
ensuring no lives was lost, was inconsistent with the model of shared responsibility – 
communities are not encouraged to take their share of responsibility for hazard mitigation ‘if 
they believe the default response to an emergency is to evacuate’ (Keelty, 2011).   
Implementation of shared responsibility must be done in the context of cultural and legal norms 
including expectations about the role of government, the right of people to make their own 
autonomous choices and the value of social and environmental considerations.    
Shared responsibility 
Responsibility is shared for bushfire management.  Each person has responsibility for their own 
preparations for and reactions to bushfire.  People are responsible for the decisions they chose to 
make; decisions to prepare their home, to obtain insurance and leave early or stay or defend are 
decisions that only individuals can make.  Agencies too are responsible for the decisions that 
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they make in planning for and responding to events.  This statement is necessarily true, but trite 
and unhelpful.  For shared responsibility to be an effective tool in reducing the risks posed by 
fire or other hazards, an explicit statement of who is responsible for what, backed up if necessary 
by policy and even legal initiatives, is required.  
The Council of Australian Governments has adopted the concept of ‘shared responsibility’ in the 
National Disaster Resilience Strategy.  In that policy statement the Australian governments 
affirm that ‘disaster resilience is a shared responsibility for individuals, households, businesses 
and communities, as well as for governments’ and that the ‘resilience approach acknowledges 
our shared, although not equal, responsibility for dealing with disasters’ (COAG, 2011). 
If responsibility is to be shared, it is important that key players and industries understand what 
their responsibility is.  To investigate that issue, researchers at the Australian National 
University, funded by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre (the Bushfire CRC) and acting 
in accordance with the approval granted by the Australian National University’s Human 
Research Ethics Committee, conducted interviews with chief officers of the Australian fire and 
emergency services to gain an insight into their understanding of shared responsibly.  There were 
three clear views: 
1. Some accepted the idea of shared responsibility accepting that that ‘Shared responsibility 
entails identifying the issues and constraints (including budget and resources) coming up 
with priority actions and agreeing on an implementation plan that involves actions and 
outcomes from all stakeholders’ (Pers. Comm, details on file with author). 
2. Some believed that the ultimate responsibility lay with the fire and emergency agencies.  
In particular, people needed to be encouraged to prepare homes and themselves for an 
emergency but without experience of having lived through previous events, residents 
could never make a fully informed decision on whether to leave, or stay and defend.  At 
the end of the day ‘a judgment call has to be made on the survivability of the fire’ (Pers. 
Comm, details on file with author).  Only the fire agencies, with access to the best 
prediction and weather data and their own experience are in a position to make that call 
so ultimate responsibility to advise and direct the community lies with them. 
3. Others take the view that at the end of the day, no matter what happens, ultimate 
responsibility for decisions and actions must lie with individuals who have to make 
decision on how they face risk.  
… at the end of the day I am always responsible for me.  You may help me.  The 
government may help me.  Everybody may help me.  But I'm responsible for me (Pers. 
Comm, details on file with author).   
Others rejected the shared responsibility ideal on the basis that it did not lead to action: 
‘… we try to avoid the shared responsibility catch line. Rather, we make it your 
responsibility... putting the onus onto the householder … is preferable so that we actually 
get some action’ (Pers. Comm, details on file with author). 
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The inference to be drawn is that there is no universal understanding of the shared responsibility 
mantra and more importantly, uncertainty as to what is being shared.  It is arguable that all of the 
views, summarized above, are consistent with shared responsibility.  Generally all agreed that it 
is up to owners and occupiers to take responsibility for preparing their properties and themselves, 
that is their responsibility but it is the responsibility of agencies to advise and warn if in the 
circumstances properties should be evacuated or other action taken.   
It may be correct that sum up shared responsibility as ‘We have a responsibility to provide 
advice. They have a responsibility to take up that advice or to adhere to that advice’ (Pers. 
Comm, details on file with author) but that begs the question of what advice are the agencies 
required to give; advice as to how to prepare the home or does it extend to advice on what to do 
right now (Eburn, 2012; Eburn and Handmer, 2011, Eburn 2008): 
What people are hearing is I’ll receive a personalised message to tell me exactly what to do in my 
circumstance right now in regards to this fire (Pers. Comm, details on file with author). 
In some cases, people will actually still expect to be told what to do on the day, as much as we try 
to move towards this concept of resilience (Pers. Comm, details on file with author). 
If the view of shared responsibility is that it is the agencies responsibility to tell people what to 
do, and it is the responsibility of individuals to do what they are told, there remains an overriding 
obligation upon government to protect people from the hazard and the consequences of their own 
actions or inaction.  This burden will become increasingly problematic in the predicted world of 
climate change, where more and more severe hazard events are predicted, and would appear to 
be inconsistent with the direction of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy which says: 
Potential escalation in the frequency and magnitude of hazards and our increasing vulnerability to 
disasters presents governments with unprecedented calls on their resources and expertise. 
Governments’ desire to help communities in need, and pressure to help those affected may be 
creating unrealistic expectations and unsustainable dependencies. Should this continue, it will 
undermine community capability and confidence. Therefore, communities need to be empowered 
to take shared responsibility for coping with disasters (COAG 2011, p 1).  
We can infer that shared responsibility is meant to be more than just a responsibility to advise 
and to act on that advice, but exactly what shared responsibility is meant to mean, is unclear.   
One suggestion is that ‘shared responsibility’ is the wrong term; a better phrase is ‘mutual 
obligation’ (Pers. Comm, details on file with author). Occupiers have an obligation to take steps 
to prepare themselves and their homes and if, and only if, they have met their obligations should 
there be an obligation upon the agencies to actively work to assist in the defence of that property.  
In one state, Tasmania, the Fire Service has adopted this type of approach through an active 
triage policy.  In Tasmania buildings are assessed as being undefendable (red), defendable with 
assistance (orange) and defendable without assistance (green).   
This express policy commitment gives meaning to the idea of shared responsibility.  Fire fighters 
will not attempt to preserve an ‘undefendable’ or ‘red’ home.  Property owners are responsible 
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for making preparations to take their property out of the undefendable classification and then, 
and only then, will the fire service accept any responsibility to assist in its defence.  The fire 
service does not guarantee either that they will defend the home (that depends on resources) or 
that the home will be saved but that they will at least work with the property owners in a mutual 
effort to save the home.   Fire fighters do not anticipate working on ‘green’ properties as they can 
be defended without assistance.  Presumably the fire service would be willing to turn out to a 
‘green’ property if circumstances change or the occupiers say they do need assistance but that is 
not expressly stated in the policy (State Fire Commission, 2009).  A person on a ‘green’ rated 
property could not expect the fire service to actively monitor their situation so it would be their 
responsibility to call the fire service if they find they do need assistance (Gardner v Northern 
Territory, 2004). 
The hidden agenda of the shared responsibility discussion is actually the question of who is 
responsible for the costs of fire damage.  If the agencies give advice on how to prepare a home, 
or that it is now time to leave, there can be no complaint if that advice is not taken and the home 
is lost.  Governments do not want to face claims for compensation in those circumstances.  If the 
homeowner has not evacuated when advised to do so, the emergency services do not want to risk 
life and limb to try and rescue them, and do not want to hear complaints that they did not do 
enough to prevent the impact of the fire or other hazard.  In short ‘Resilient communities … will 
not start the blame game when an incident occurs’; shared responsibility means ‘that no one 
group or agency can be charged with blame or negligence after an event’ (Pers. Comm, details 
on file with author).  
What’s the policy objective? 
The National Disaster Resilience Strategy does not identify what is meant by a resilient 
community or how we are to identify if a community is resilient or, at least, resilient enough 
(Jongejan et al, 2011).   Further it is not clear what the policy is expected to achieve.  Will an 
individual who understands ‘the risks that may affect them and others in their community’ and 
who has ‘taken steps to anticipate disasters and to protect themselves their assets and their 
livelihoods’ (COAG, 2011) necessarily behave as the fire agencies would wish them to?   
If the objective is to allow people to make informed decisions, so that they understand the risks 
they face they may still make choices to face a risk rather than leave a danger zone.  A person 
who understands the risks of fire would understand that by preparing their home and themselves, 
they have maximised their chance of survival but that there always remains a residual risk.   A 
person who truly understands the risk will understand that the risk of dying is low but that it does 
remain a risk.  If they stay and defend their property, but despite their best efforts their property 
is lost, or worse, they die, then that is not evidence that their risk assessment or risk 
understanding was wrong or that the fire agency did not properly exercise its responsibility. It is 
evidence only of the fact that low probability risks are still risks but an informed person may 
choose to accept that risk. 
If the policy objective is to have people understand the risk and to act accordingly, then we have 
to let people who do understand the risk make decisions that others may prefer they did not 
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make; like a decision to stay and defend a home in catastrophic fire conditions.  The fire agencies 
may well want to save all lives, but if I am responsible for my own choices, including choosing 
whether to leave or stay or defend, then I am under no obligation to exercise my choice, my 
responsibility, to achieve someone else’s policy goal. 
If, on the other hand, the policy objective is to ‘save lives’ then an understanding of the risk is 
important only to the extent it makes people compliant with the direction or advice that they 
should leave.  That is sharing responsibility if the resident’s responsibility is to ‘adhere to that 
advice’ but not if their responsibility is to make decisions based on their understanding of their 
own wellbeing.  On that view of ‘shared responsibility’ the responsibility is not only not equal it 
weighs heavily on the emergency services.  On that view the obligation is not only to warn 
communities but to have in place evacuation plans and process to remove people from harm’s 
way.  If people are responsible to make their own informed decisions, then they are responsible 
for their own decision to leave early or stay and defend; and if they chose to leave to make their 
own arrangements to do so.   
Using law to translate policy into action 
The first step in translating the policy into action is to define the policy objective.  Let us assume 
that the objective is to allow people to make their own choices, to the extent that they alone are 
affected by those choices, but to limit their ability when others, such as the disabled, children, 
visitors or those who cannot make decisions for themselves are involved; we may permit adults 
to stay and defend a home but we should not let them put their children at risk or people who 
have come to the area and do not understand the risks. 
Current law imposes obligations and duties upon governments and fire agencies. Australian fire 
agencies have legislative obligations to provide fire fighting services and various powers, 
including the power to order evacuations and to take water, to achieve their objectives.  The 
actions of the fire brigades may cause damage and even increase vulnerability (for example by 
taking resources from private home owners for the benefit of the greater good).   Fire agencies 
and government agencies generally may be sued if it is alleged that they have negligently caused 
damage and their actions are routinely scrutinised in after event reviews.   
Residents on the other hand, have very few legal obligations. The occupier of a property may be 
under a common law duty to take precautions against the spread of fire (Goldman v Hargrave, 
1966; Burnie Port Authority v General Jones, 1994) but the exact extent of that duty and whether 
or not the occupiers conduct was reasonable in the circumstances will be contestable. 
To achieve a greater share of responsibility the law could be changed to impose stringent 
obligations backed up civil or criminal penalties. For example: 
• Building approvals could require that all homes in bushfire prone areas maintain a 50m 
hazard reduction zone, with cut grass, no flammable material stored by the side of the 
property, separate water storage for fire fighting along with pumps and generators to 
maintain the water supply during a fire.   Homeowners could be required to have the 
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property inspected at the start of each fire season and provide to the council and the local 
fire brigade a certificate issued by an independent assessor verifying that the fire 
mitigation measures are in place and have been maintained to a prescribed standard.   
Failure to maintain the premises could be met with an improvement notice, an on the spot 
fine, or by having council or the fire brigade come in and do the work and render an 
account for the full cost.   
• The process of building triage, discussed above, could be applied at the development 
stage and require that planners and developers build and maintain properties that are 
triaged ‘green’.  The process could also be applied to insurance so that levies charged for 
fire services, whether charged on property values or insurance premiums are adjusted to 
reflect the buildings ‘triage’ rating (although that could lead to a perverse result if ‘red’ 
buildings were charged less on the basis that the fire brigade was not prepared to respond 
to, or defend those buildings).     
• Borrowing from work health and safety legislation a law could be passed imposing a duty 
on every homeowner and the occupier of property to ensure, so far as is reasonably 
practical, the safety of people on their property from bushfire.  As with work health and 
safety laws this duty could be extended to include a duty to one-self (so, as in work health 
and safety law where a self-employed person has a duty to ensure their own health and 
safety, the occupier of a property could be required to ensure not only the safety of 
others, but themselves).  The duty could be backed up with criminal penalties. 
• Occupiers could be held liable to meet the entire cost of fire fighting efforts where it can 
be shown they illegally or negligently allowed a fire to start on, or spread from, their 
property.  This is done in some jurisdictions (Cal Health & Saf Code § 13009 (Deering 
2010); Forest and Rural Fires Act 1977 (NZ) s 4) but, even though the power exists in 
the Northern Territory (Bushfires Act 1980 (NT) s 57A) and Western Australia (Bush 
Fires Act 1954 (WA) s 58) it appears never to have been used (Eburn and Dovers, 2012). 
• Areas that are perceived to be too high a risk could be acquired by government using 
compulsory acquisition laws so that people are forced to move out of bushfire prone 
areas. 
• At a community level councils and the local fire brigade could be given extensive powers 
to clear land and maintain fire exclusion zones.   
Applying those measures would be an example of shared responsibility in the same way that 
work health and safety laws share, or impose, responsibility across the entire workplace, from 
company officers to visitors.   Using these tools responsibility will be assigned or shared, even if 
people are forced, rather than encouraged, to accept their share of responsibility.  Identifying 
how to impose shared responsibility is relatively easy.  What is harder is determining whether or 
not these options are possible or practical.  Would there be the political will in parliament to pass 
the necessary laws, a willingness to commit resources to enforce them and would the public, and 
importantly the voting public, be prepared to accept them and the necessary restrictions on 
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freedom that they imply?  If governments are not prepared to impose tough regulations to require 
people to prepare for fires, are have prepared to accept that lives will be lost?  Are governments 
willing to say, after a catastrophic fire, that people who chose to stay and defend and who died, 
made their own choice and celebrate the fact that they had freedom to choose, even if the choice 
meant that they died? 
Striking the balance between allowing people freedom to choose, requiring land clearing to 
create buffer zones regardless of the impact on amenity, or refusing land and vegetation clearing 
because of the impact on amenity, bio-diversity, carbon sequestration and the like, are all 
political choices.  As we have argued elsewhere 
Mainstreaming emergency management does not mean forsaking all other considerations and 
policy objectives. Mainstreaming requires that emergency management objectives are considered 
when determining how to achieve various policy objectives; but competing policy objectives still  
need to be balanced rather than having one trump all others. Emergency management, even if 
considered a mainstream and whole-of-government priority cannot, or should not, assume the role 
of the dominant or sole policy objective. If it did the forests would be destroyed and other choices 
diminished. At the extreme Victoria could be made fire proof by covering it with concrete and 
placing a fire engine and crew at every home. That is not an option even if it would reduce to zero 
the chance of anyone dying in a bushfire. It would destroy the economy and the natural 
environment (Eburn and Jackman, 2011, p 75). 
Determining how those objectives are to be balanced requires recognition that economic, 
environmental and social objectives are real, as are emergency management objectives.  Critical 
questions are ‘What do we want to the world to look like?’ and ‘How safe do we want to be?’  
Sharing responsibility may be more than just sharing responsibility for emergency management 
in the face of a fire or flood, but acknowledging we all share responsibility for how we answer 
these broader questions.  Vulnerability to fire is not just a function of landscape and weather but 
also a product of the choices we, collectively, make through the political process.   
Conclusion 
Australian governments recognise that they are unable to meet increased demands for emergency 
services, whether that increase is due to the predicted rise in natural hazard events caused by 
global warming, growing population, or changing social preferences.  Regardless of the causes 
the demands are, or will be, unsustainable.  To address these changes, governments are moving 
to an explicit policy of shared responsibility and community resilience based on community’s 
understanding of risk and developing an ability to prepare themselves for the impact of disasters. 
Laudable as these goals are, they remain uncertain.  In this paper we considered the concept of 
shared responsibility from the point of view of government and government agencies, in 
particular fire fighting services.  By interviewing chief officers from Australia’s fire and 
emergency services we identified that shared responsibility is a necessary reality, however the 
extent to which responsibility is shared, how much is ‘your’ responsibility and how much the 
government’s, is contested and not universally understood.  That must mean that fire agencies, 
even when using the language of resilience and shared responsibility, do not necessarily agree on 
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what the terms mean or require.  If the fire agencies do not have a common understanding, it is 
likely that governments and the communities also do not have a common understanding.  The 
predictable problem is clear; in times of calm everyone is using the same language and may well 
think they mean the same thing, but in times of crisis, or at the next inquiry after the next 
catastrophic fire, it will be discovered that the various stakeholders had different meanings in 
mind and different ideas of who should have expected what from whom. 
Resolving these issues requires governments to take the lead and to articulate the objective of 
emergency management policy; is it to facilitate informed decision making? Prevent all fire or 
natural hazard related deaths? Or something else?  Having identified the policy objectives 
governments need to lead the discussion on the true cost of meeting those objectives, costs that 
are measured not only in money but with impacts upon freedom, amenity and environmental 
objectives. 
The true measure of shared responsibility is when everyone realises that vulnerability to fire and 
other natural hazards is not just a product of the weather and the landscape, but also the choices 
we make on how and where to live. 
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